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Notice and Choice is the model for protecting privacy online in the
United States. Under the model, users of online services are given notice
about services information and privacy practices in the form of privacy
policies. Based on this information, users can choose whether to use particular online services and whether to exercise any options for protecting
their privacy that the services might offer.
In theory, Notice and Choice seems like a sound regulatory mechanism. Indeed, state and federal regulatory agencies prefer the model as a
basis for privacy enforcement action. But Notice and Choice faces harsh
criticism from privacy advocates. This Note adds a new critique to the
list—that Notice and Choice leaves individual consumers who are affected by privacy policy breaches, legally, empty-handed. This is because
website privacy policies—the principal mechanism for effectuating Notice and Choice—are generally not considered to be legally binding
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agreements. As a result, individuals’ contract theory-based actions
against companies for privacy policy breaches almost categorically fail.
As a result, the users of online services are largely left without individual
redress for privacy policy breaches.
Much has been written about Notice and Choice, and even more has
been written about online contracting. Yet, like Notice and Choice and
contract theory themselves, these two bodies of scholarship remain misaligned. This Note fills that gap by addressing Notice and Choice in the
context of contracts, and offers alternative solutions to give individuals
the opportunity to seek redress in the Notice and Choice scheme through
contract theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you bought a plane ticket online. To complete
your order, you provided the airline with your name, address,
phone number, credit card number, and other sensitive personal
information. Before you did this, you read the airline’s privacy policy, which promised that the airline would not share any of your
information with third parties. This promise gave you faith that you
could safely entrust the airline with your information.
Months later, the Department of Defense hired a data analytics
company to build a model for identifying individuals who might
pose a threat to military facilities. At the Transportation Security
Administration’s urging, the airline from whom you have bought
your ticket shared your information, and the information of other
customers, with the data analytics company in blatant violation of
the airline’s privacy policy.
Based on the privacy policy you read, you expected that your
personal information would not be transferred in this way. You sue
the airline for breaching the policy. You believe you will win because the airline made a promise to not share your personal information, and it broke that promise. But in reality, you might not
have it so easy.
The Internet has become a tool that billions of people around
the world use every day to work, play, shop, socialize, and learn.
Rapidly evolving technologies enable companies to track users online and collect ever-more-granular information about their Internet use habits—from details about website browsing history to
records of individual keystrokes and clicks.1 Websites and other
providers of online services collect and use this information for
their own commercial gain.2
But there is a trade-off: Websites and online services often offer
free content and personalized services to individuals in exchange
for sharing personal information.3 This model of commerce poses
risks, however; it can lead to discrimination (based on price or other factors) or can result in non-quantifiable harms, such as the ex1
2
3

See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503.
See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
Id.
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posure of sensitive personal information.4 For these reasons, significant policy-making efforts have been expended to establish boundaries for the collection and use of personal information.5
Despite such efforts, the United States has not adopted a comprehensive privacy law.6 Instead, a patchwork quilt of federal and
state laws narrowly targeted to specific sectors and actors establish
privacy rules.7 However, individuals’ personal information collected by websites and online services is not protected by these industry-specific laws; instead, it is protected by a self-regulatory regime referred to as “Notice and Choice.”8
Under the Notice and Choice model, websites or online services provide individuals with disclosure about their information practices, such as those pertaining to data collection, use, sharing, and
security.9 This knowledge, in turn, empowers individuals to make
choices with respect to whether and how they will use the service.10

4

See Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy, in
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 76, 83 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); see also
Kim Zetter, The Year’s 11 Biggest Hacks, from Ashley Madison to OPM, WIRED (Dec. 23,
2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/the-years-11-biggest-hacks-fromashley-madison-to-opm/ [https://perma.cc/3AN6-TFP6].
5
See, e.g., Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510
(Supp. 2015).
6
See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ AND JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF
U.S. DATA PROTECTION 7–10 (1996).
7
See id.; Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208–10 (1992). For example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), protects
personally identifiable health information and provides patients with a host of rights
regarding that information by imposing layered privacy safeguards. Similarly, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012), protects information held by credit
reporting agencies by giving consumers the right to access, dispute, and correct
information about them. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), limits
government access to private information that is stored and transmitted on the Internet.
8
See infra Section II.A.
9
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation
Work? An Empirical Study of Privacy Policies 2–3 (Apr. 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
10
See id.
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Privacy policies are the primary mechanism for ensuring valid
Notice and Choice.11 Websites and online services use privacy policies to disclose their information practices.12 As this Note explains,
however, privacy policies generally lack contractually binding effect.13 This means that in the event of a privacy policy breach, users
are unable to seek redress by relying on contract theories.14 This
Note argues that this reality undermines Notice and Choice by
running contrary to its objectives and rationales.15
The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes what privacy
policies are, what they are meant to do, and the main critiques privacy policies face, including the fact that courts tend to interpret
privacy policies as non-binding agreements. It concludes by discussing the practical effects of this state of affairs. Part II outlines
the Notice and Choice regime and its history before arguing that
privacy policies’ non-contractual, non-binding nature is incongruent with Notice and Choice and its rationales and objectives. Part
III offers potential solutions for this disconnect, including formbased and technology-based approaches.
I. NON-CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY POLICIES
This Part examines the enforceability of privacy policies as
binding, contractual agreements. First, it describes privacy policies
generally in terms of purpose and form. Next, it offers critiques of
privacy policies. Then, the Part analyzes why contract claims
founded on privacy policy breaches typically fail, and discusses the
practical implications of this state of affairs.
A. Privacy Policies Generally
We live in a global economy supported by a common currency:
information.16 The companies we interact with online compile
11

See discussion infra Section I.A.
Id.
13
See discussion infra Section I.C.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See generally William D. Eggers et al., Data as the New Currency, DELOITTE REV., July
24, 2013, at 18, 20–21.
12
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massive quantities of data about their customers.17 When we use
allegedly “free” services—for example, those provided by
Google—we pay for those services by enabling the service provider
to build a database of information about our searches, online activity, and personal information.18 The service provider may then leverage this data for commercial gain.19
Privacy policies are meant to address how a company such as
Google handles customer information. Generally, privacy policies
are “comprehensive disclosure[s]” describing how websites and
online services handle their users’ information.20 Though a privacy
policy’s precise content depends on a company’s specific information practices, privacy policies typically include disclosures of how
companies collect, use, disclose, retain, and manage customer information.21
Privacy policies are meant to increase the transparency of websites’ information practices so that users are aware of those practices.22 These policies often suggest that users refrain from using
the website or service if they disagree with the policy terms.23 Put
another way, privacy policies provide users with notice of a website’s information practices. With this notice, users can make a
17

Id.
Id.
19
Companies perform large-scale analytics on their databases to convert data into
actionable knowledge. See Thomas H. Davenport et al., Data to Knowledge to Results:
Building an Analytic Capability, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV., no. 2, Winter 2001, at 117, 128. For
example, companies use consumer data to deliver advertisements to individual consumers
based on their online behavior. One recent estimate suggests that online advertising is a
$23 billion per year industry. See INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, INTERNET
ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT 3 (2009), http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_PwC_
2008_full_year.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY2H-9TFV]; see also Darrell Etherington, Google
Stops Mining Education Gmail and Google Apps Accounts for Ad Targeting, TECHCRUNCH,
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/30/google-stops-mining-educationgmail-and-google-apps-accounts-for-ad-targeting/ [https://perma.cc/3ARK-3RNE].
20
Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Contractual Nature of Online Policies Remains
Unsettled, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2010, at 2.
21
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/
privacy/policy/privacy-policy.html [https://perma.cc/ZK9Z-DNBY] (last updated June
10, 2015).
22
See Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 596 (2007).
23
Id.
18
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choice about whether to use the website or service, depending on
how its information practices comport with their personal privacy
preferences. This model is referred to as “Notice and Choice,”
and it is the preferred method for protecting privacy online in the
United States.24
Today, nearly all companies have a privacy policy.25 Though
not required by law except in certain circumstances (e.g., to comply
with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act26 (“COPPA”)),
privacy policies are de facto mandatory. In 2003, California
enacted the California Online Privacy Protection Act27 (“CalOPPA”), which requires that operators of commercial websites that
collect personal information from California residents post a privacy notice that fulfills certain requirements.28 Because online businesses typically serve a national audience, despite the physical location of users, the California law effectively imposes a requirement
that all entities conducting business online in the United States
post a privacy policy.
B. Common Privacy Policy Critiques
Privacy policies face a number of critiques. First, people rarely
read or even see online privacy policies.29 Those that attempt to
24

Notice and Choice will be more thoroughly described infra Section II.A.
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 594 (2014). According to Professor Haynes: “In 1998,
only 2% of all websites had some form of privacy notices, and in 1999, eighteen of the top
100 shopping sites did not display a privacy policy. By 2001, virtually all of the most
popular commercial websites had privacy notices. . . .” Haynes, supra note 22, at 593–94.
26
COPPA requires that online services which collect information from children under
13 obtain parental consent to such collection after posting “a prominent and clearly
labeled link to an online notice of its information practices with regard to children on the
home or landing page or screen of its Web site or online service, and, at each area of the
Web site or online service where personal information is collected from children.” FTC
Commercial Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d) (2016).
27
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014).
28
The statute requires that an operator of commercial websites or online services that
collect personally identifiable information about individual consumers residing in
California “conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site, or in the case of an
operator of an online service, make that policy available” via “reasonably accessible
means of making the privacy policy available for consumers of the online service.”
§§ 22575(a), 22577(b)(5).
29
See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1885 (2013). Even Chief Justice Roberts admits to not reading
25

188

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:181

read the policies are unlikely to understand them because they are
long and often filled with legal jargon.30 And, given the multitude of
complex ways that companies might use and manipulate information, it is difficult—if not impossible—for companies to accurately
describe their information practices in a concise privacy statement.31 For this reason, privacy policy drafters often employ vague
or ambiguous language to either generalize very complex information practices or reserve the option to alter specific information
practices in the future without creating the need to revise the policy.32 Due to privacy policies’ length, complexity, and incomprehensibility, it would prove extremely costly in both time and rethe fine print he encounters online. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits
He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, ABA J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_rea
d_the_computer_fine_print/ [https://perma.cc/RDF8-YAEX].
30
See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 930 (2013); Solove, supra
note 29, at 1885; see also Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/
13basics.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/82TX-M2QQ] (contrasting Facebook’s privacy
policy length with that of the U.S. Constitution). The FTC has echoed this concern. See
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework
for Consumers, Businesses, and Policymakers (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2010/12/ftc-staff-issues-privacy-report-offers-frameworkconsumers [https://perma.cc/TV5H-WZ36] (noting that the “notice-and-choice model,
as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers
typically do not read, let alone understand”); see also United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d
854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (dictum) (“Our access to . . . remote computers is
governed by a series of private agreements and policies that most people are only dimly
aware of and virtually no one reads or understands.”). In an amusing anecdote
exemplifying the point, a company called PC Pitstop promised in its terms of use to pay a
cash prize to anyone who read the terms and wrote to the company to claim the prize; it
took months before a consumer noticed the promise and wrote in. See Larry Magrid, It
Pays to Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.
asp [https://perma.cc/5LHM-AS8H] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
31
See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 436–37 (2011) (“Privacy policies
for the first-party websites that users interact with are difficult enough for users to
understand, but when third-party sites enter the mix, the notion of effective privacy
notice becomes completely untenable.”); Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond
Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 SUFFOLK U. J. HIGH TECH. 370, 390–98
(2014).
32
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of Regulation,
45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
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sources for an Internet user to read the privacy policy of every
website he or she visited.33
C. Privacy Policies as Contracts?
Occasionally, websites or online services engage in information
practices that differ from those described in their privacy policies:
In contractual terms, they breach the policy.34 But plaintiffs who
have been the victims of alleged breaches have experienced difficulty alleging viable contract claims.35 This runs contrary to early
views on the issue: As privacy policies began to emerge, scholarship argued that contract law should play a role in their enforcement.36 This view made sense, especially considering that some
policies contained statements assuring users that the policies would
be binding upon them.37 But, as case law on the issue has devel33

See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for
Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012). Cranor
estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read the privacy
policy of every website he or she visited. Id. This translates to about 54 billion hours and
$781 million worth of time. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 540, 560–61 (2008).
34
See Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and
in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91–92 (1999).
35
See id.
36
Id. (“As between the website and the user, a privacy policy bears all of the earmarks
of a contract. . . .”). See generally Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76
TENN. L. REV. 379 (2009).
37
See Haynes, supra note 22, at 596 (describing how some websites presented their
privacy policy terms as binding on the user); Raysman & Brown, supra note 20 (noting
that “users implicitly acknowledge that they have read and understood the policy and
agree to be legally bound by it”). Privacy policy enforcement cases follow a track that is
slightly different from the typical case seeking enforcement of online terms. In many of
the cases that establish the principles of online contracting, websites or providers of
online services typically fight to enforce elements of their online terms against consumers.
See Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up
to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 179–83 (2007). For example, a user of an
online service will bring an action against the service in court, and the service will move to
compel arbitration per the service’s terms of use. See id. at 181–83. Privacy policy
enforcement cases, on the other hand, typically follow a different trajectory. In those
cases, a user of a website or online service alleges that the website or service breached its
privacy policy and that it should be held accountable for breaching a policy term. See
Haynes, supra note 22, at 606–09. In the first line of cases, users try to escape
enforceability of a policy term; in the latter, users fight to have policy terms enforced.
And often, in the first line of cases, users try to claim that no binding agreement exists,
whereas in the latter, they allege that the privacy policy is indeed a binding agreement.
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oped, it has become clear that contract law is not as useful a tool for
addressing privacy policy enforceability as early scholars thought it
would be.38
Indeed, courts have eschewed contract theory when analyzing
privacy policy enforceability.39 Instead of finding that a privacy policy is binding on one party or the other, courts determine that no
privacy agreement exists between the parties in the first place.40 In
these cases, courts take the view that privacy policies are general
statements of policy rather than enforceable contracts.41
Privacy policy form contributes to this result. In the online
space, two basic types of agreements dominate: clickwrap and
browsewrap.42 Clickwrap agreements are designed to secure a us38

See, e.g., Jurin v. Google Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(dismissing breach of contract claims arising out of the alleged breach by Google of its
AdWords policy terms and conditions on the ground that a “broadly stated promise to
abide by its own policy does not hold Defendant to a contract”); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines
Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs could not
maintain suit against Northwest Airlines for breach of its privacy statement because it was
not a contract); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 WL
1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The usual rule in contract cases is that general
statements of policy are not contractual.”); see also Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-JWL,
2007 WL 3120695, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (noting that unilateral corporate
policies generally do not support breach of contract claims).
39
See Jurin, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
40
See Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
41
See In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459, at *6.
42
The distinction this Note draws between the clickwrap model and the browsewrap
model is a simplified one, as the line between the two is sometimes blurred. For over a
decade, courts have had difficulty drawing this distinction and applying it in their cases.
See, e.g., Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
(resolving that the agreement on the Hotels.com website “cannot be neatly characterized
as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’”); see also Venkat Balasubramani, The
“Browsewrap”/”Clickwrap” Distinction Is Falling Apart, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(Feb. 24, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/02/the-browsewrap
clickwrap-distinction-is-falling-apart.htm [https://perma.cc/Z67B-GACD] (summarizing
recent decisions imprecisely drawing the browsewrap/clickwrap distinction). This is
because, sometimes, online agreements do not fit neatly into one of these forms. To
account for this, some authorities have proposed a third online contracting category—
“modified clickwrap”—which include elements of both clickwraps and browsewraps.
See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910–11 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Deborah Davis Boykin, Survey of E-Contracting Cases: Browsewrap, Clickwrap, and
Modified Clickwrap Agreements, 68 BUS. LAW. 257, 257, 259–262 (2012). At least one court
has abandoned the clickwrap/browsewrap distinction in its decision-making. See Hoffman
v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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er’s express assent to an agreement.43 Under the clickwrap model,
a website presents a user with the website’s terms and requires that
the user assent to those terms by clicking an icon—usually reading
“I Accept” or “I Agree”—to signal her assent before using the
website.44 Courts find clickwrap agreements enforceable when users have knowledge of the presented terms,45 including unread
terms.46 Courts enforce clickwrap agreements because it is easy to
identify whether and when a user consents to the agreement
terms.47
Privacy policies, however, often take the browsewrap form.
Browsewrap agreements are visible on a separate webpage accessible via a hyperlink on the main webpage; a website user may click
that link to visit, view, and read the site’s terms.48 Users are not
required to visit and view these agreements before using the website or service,49 but the terms are nonetheless purportedly binding
on the user.50 Browsewrap agreements do not require that a user
affirmatively consent to the terms, so in the browsewrap context it
is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment of assent that the tradi2011) (recognizing a division in case law about the extent to which clickwrap features are
needed to make contractual provisions enforceable, and instead deciding an online
contract assent issue on notice grounds). But for my purposes here, the simplified
distinction suffices.
43
See Rambarran & Hunt, supra note 37, at 174, 177.
44
See id.
45
See, e.g., Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2012)
(enforcing clickwrap terms against plaintiffs after determining that they had expressed
assent to the terms on two different occasions by clicking “I Acknowledge” and “I
Agree”).
46
See, e.g., Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2012)
(enforcing unread clickwrap terms where a plaintiff checked a box acknowledging that he
had, in fact, read them).
47
See id.
48
See Rambarran & Hunt, supra note 37, at 174. Links to browsewrap agreements can
usually be found at the bottom of a website’s homepage, and often appear in language
such as “Legal” or “Terms of Use.” Id. at 176; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25,
at 592.
49
See Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the
user can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the
browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists.”).
50
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002); Pollstar v. Gigmania,
Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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tional principles of contract formation require.51 Because clear manifestation of assent is often lacking in the browsewrap context,
courts’ analysis of whether such agreements are binding between
the parties “turns on whether a website user has actual or constructive knowledge of a [web]site’s terms and conditions prior to
using the [web]site.”52 A few exceptions notwithstanding, browsewrap agreements are usually held not enforceable.53 When a priva-

51

See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465–66 (2006).
Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B., 2007 WL 4823761, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007).
53
See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every
page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take
any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to
relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to
constructive notice.”); Specht, 306 F.3d at 35 (holding that hidden, linked-to license
agreement terms were not binding on plaintiffs, who lacked notice of and did not assent to
the terms); Be In, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (declining to enforce Terms of Service against
defendants because, except for the existence of a “Terms of Service” hyperlink, no
allegations showed that the defendants had notice that mere use of the plaintiff’s website
amounted to assent to the Terms); Defontes v. Dell Computs. Corp., No. C.A. PC 032636, 2004 WL 253560, at *6 (R.I. Super. Jan. 29, 2004), aff’d, 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009)
(no manifestation of assent to online terms and conditions that were only accessible via an
inconspicuous hyperlink at the bottom of Dell’s webpage). The cases in which courts
enforce browsewrap agreements typically present unique facts in that the parties are
businesses or are otherwise sophisticated. For example, courts have enforced
browsewraps in instances where one party continually violates the other’s terms after
receiving explicit notice of the terms and instructions to cease the violation. See, e.g., Sw.
Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *7–8 (finding terms binding on defendant after it
continued to use the plaintiff’s website after receiving a letter ordering it to cease and
desist the activity that violated the terms); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (enforcing
terms when defendant continued to breach terms of use even after receiving a letter from
plaintiff citing the terms and replying that it did not accept those terms). Other cases
enforce browsewrap terms where the party against whom the terms are to be enforced
admitted to having knowledge of the terms. See, e.g., Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429–30;
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 1, 2005). Browsewrap agreements have also been enforced when factual
allegations beyond a browsewrap’s terms or presentation support the notion that a user
had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms. See, e.g., AvePoint, Inc. v. Power
Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 510–11 (W.D. Va. 2013) (declining to declare a
browsewrap agreement unenforceable at the motion to dismiss stage when facts alleged
that the defendant corporation used a fictitious email to download plaintiff’s software,
which, by its terms, was not to be used for commercial purposes).
52
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cy policy takes browsewrap form, it then becomes difficult to find
that the policy amounts to a binding agreement.54
In fact, it has been industry practice to draft privacy policies in
this way so that they do not constitute enforceable agreements.55
Since privacy policies enforcement is typically sought by users and
against websites or online services, and because the services can
include in their terms of use any provisions they would like to be
binding on the user, websites typically “opt not to provide users
with another reason to sue them” and assure users that the privacy
policy is a mere policy statement not intended to be a contract.56
Another reason that courts reject contract claims for privacy
policy breaches is because plaintiffs fail to allege cognizable damages resulting from the breach—an essential element of a breach of
contract claim.57 Proving damages resulting from privacy policy
breaches is extremely difficult. For example, a claim for mere emotional harm stemming from a loss of privacy is not sufficient as an
54

See Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5.
IAN C. BALLON, 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: A LEGAL TREATISE WITH
FORMS § 26.14[2] (2d ed. 2014).
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 094567 (RBK/KMW), 2010 WL 1799456, at *10 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (holding that the
plaintiff could, in principle, assert a breach of contract claim based on privacy policy
breach, but nevertheless granting defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiff did
not allege any damages resulting from the alleged breach); Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604
F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling that the plaintiff’s receipt of spam email
after defendant disclosed her email address in contravention of its privacy policy failed to
give rise to recoverable damages); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp.
2d 299, 325–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss because the
plaintiff did not allege any damages resulting from the alleged breach); In re Am. Airlines,
Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’
breach of contract claim on the ground of failure to allege damages); In re Nw. Airlines
Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6,
2004). But see In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172–74 (S.D. Cal.
2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim where plaintiffs alleged that
they purchased flowers from a website subject to the Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and
Rewards Policies posted on the website and were, as a result, unknowingly enrolled in a
rewards program that automatically charged them an activation fee). EasySaver
eventually settled, so it remains unclear whether the court would have enforced the
privacy policy at issue as a contract later in litigation. See Megan Leonhardt, ProFlowers
Parent Co. Arranges $38M Deal over Data Policies, LAW360 (June 14, 2012, 2:19 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/350092/proflowers-parent-co-arranges-38m-deal-overdata-policies [https://perma.cc/VZF4-RCH6].
55
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allegation of damages.58 Neither is a claim for mere loss of privacy.59 Courts have also held that personally identifiable information
is not considered property and thus has no compensable value, despite concrete evidence to the contrary.60
As an alternative to alleging damages, some plaintiffs have attempted to lean on promissory estoppel to have their contract
claims considered.61 Promissory estoppel is a doctrine providing
that if a party relies on a promise, the promise can be enforced even
though the essential elements of a contract (e.g., damages) are not
met.62 But like plaintiffs alleging pure contract claims, plaintiffs
alleging promissory estoppel have seen little success, as they are

58

See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(rejecting embarrassment and property-based theories of harm as insufficient to state
claim for breach of contract); Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37,
45–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
59
See Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01399 EJD, 2012 WL 5471149, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (finding that “[m]ere disclosure of such information in and of
itself, without a showing of actual harm, is insufficient” to support a claim of breach of
contract); Smith, 2010 WL 1799456, at *10 (“[E]ven assuming that a contract did exist
between Comcast and Plaintiff that incorporated the above terms, and even assuming that
Comcast violated those terms, Plaintiff must still plead loss flowing from the breach to
sustain a claim. . . . He has not done so.”); Cherny, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (“This Court
finds that the release of an e-mail address, by itself, does not constitute an injury sufficient
to state a claim under any of the legal theories Cherny asserts.”).
60
See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[P]ersonal information does not constitute property. . . .”); Stayart v. Google Inc., 783
F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“[P]laintiff alleges no facts which suggest that
her name has any commercial value. . . .”); In re JetBlue, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 327
(“[T]here is absolutely no support for the proposition that the personal information of an
individual JetBlue passenger had any value for which that passenger could have expected
to be compensated.”). These conclusions seem to skirt the reality that personal
information is a highly valued commodity. See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., Corporate Privacy
Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of
Financial Assets, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 12–15 (2009) (summarizing the multiple ways
that personal information is valuable to companies that possess it); Julie Brill, Comm’r,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Proskauer on Privacy 4 (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/79X8E3E] (“[T]he collection and use of consumer information . . . underwrites so much of
the free content available to consumers online.”); see also supra notes 16–19 and
accompanying text.
61
See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 694 (1965).
62
See id. at 698; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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typically unable to show detrimental reliance on the privacy policy
allegedly breached.63
The effect of this is that as privacy policies have grown in
prominence, fewer and fewer cases alleging privacy policy breach
have been grounded on contract theories. The inutility of contract
law for enforcing privacy policy promises calls into question the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Notice and Choice model for
privacy protection.
II. CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR ADDRESSING
PRIVACY POLICY BREACHES IS INCONGRUENT WITH
NOTICE AND CHOICE
Contract law’s ineffectiveness for addressing privacy policy
breaches exposes a gap in the Notice and Choice approach. This
Part addresses that gap. First, the Part describes Notice and Choice
in terms of what it is, what is intended to do, and why it is considered important. Then the Part argues that privacy policies’ noncontractual, non-binding nature is incongruent with the Notice and
Choice model.
A. Notice and Choice: The U.S. Approach to Online Privacy
1. Notice and Choice Generally
Notice and Choice is the preferred model for protecting individuals’ privacy online.64 The general thrust of the scheme is that
63

See, e.g., Azeltine v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-218-TUC-RCC (HCE), 2010 WL
6511710, at *10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim after determining that plaintiff alleged no reliance on Bank of America’s privacy
policy); Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 094567(RBK/KMW), 2011 WL 900096, at *10 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011) (“[T]here is no
evidence . . . that Plaintiff relied on a promise . . . . Therefore, no reasonable jury could
conclude that a contract existed between the parties based upon a doctrine of promissory
estoppel.”); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 595. But see Meyer v. Christie,
No. 07-2230-JWL, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4–6 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (allowing plaintiff
to sue for breach of a bank’s privacy policy where the plaintiff had a long-term
relationship with the bank that led him to rely on the bank to preserve his confidential
information in accordance with the policy).
64
Notice and Choice is also sometimes referred to as Notice and Consent. See, e.g.,
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in
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an entity that collects or uses individuals’ personal information
must disclose the ways it collects and uses that information and
must afford individuals an opportunity to choose whether and how
to transact with the entity.65 Privacy policies are the primary means
for effectuating Notice and Choice.66
Valid notice requires that an entity disclose to individuals its
data practices before collecting or using their personal information.67 Adequate disclosure requires providing specific details about
data collection, use, sharing, security, and other similar elements.68
Choice is a consent-based theory centered on the notion that consumers should have options with respect to how their collected
personal information will be used and that they should be able to
make informed privacy choices based on their personal privacy preferences.69
The principles behind Notice and Choice have been evolving
since the early 1970s, at which time concerns about the potentially
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON
APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 4
(2009), https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72BD-KY3D] (defining “notice and consent”); Fred H. Cate, The
Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF
THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 342, 351 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (addressing notice and
consent principles for data collection).
65
See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 64.
66
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (1998), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/
priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RS-RF7A] (“In the Internet context, notice can be
accomplished easily by the posting of an information practice disclosure describing an
entity’s information practices on a company’s site on the Web.”).
67
Id.
68
Some of which might include:
identification of the entity collecting the data; identification of the
uses to which the data will be put; identification of any potential
recipients of the data; the nature of the data collected and the means
by which it is collected if not obvious (passively, by means of
electronic monitoring, or actively, by asking the consumer to provide
the information); whether the provision of the requested data is
voluntary or required, and the consequences of a refusal to provide
the requested information; and the steps taken by the data collector to
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and quality of the data.
See id. at 7–8.
69
Id. at 8.
THE
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harmful consequences of computer-based technologies incubated.70
The concept of what is now referred to as Notice and Choice was
articulated for the first time in a 1977 Privacy Protection Study
Commission report on mailing lists maintained for commercial
purposes.71
In the 1990s, as Internet use became prevalent, issues of online
privacy and notice began to take center stage. By the mid-1990s,
both the White House and the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) began to implement key theories of the Notice and
Choice approach in policymaking efforts.72 Later in the decade,
70

In 1973, an Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems produced a
report which advised that private and public sector organizations implementing programs
for maintaining information about individuals should provide annual public notice of the
“existence and character” of their programs, and which also offered a list specific
elements the notice should contain. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 57–58 (1973). A year later,
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012), which was designed to
regulate the federal government’s collection and protection of citizens’ personal
information. The Privacy Act also called for the creation of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission (“PPSC”), which was charged with analyzing various privacy and recordkeeping practices arising in both the public and commercial sectors. Pub. L. No. 93-579,
§ 5, 88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974) (current version at § 552a).
71
The PPSC investigated whether parties maintaining mailing lists for commercial
purposes should be required to de-identify individuals appearing on the list. PRIVACY
PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–54 (July
1977). The PPSC’s report on the matter recommended that private sector organizations
that share their mailing lists with third parties should provide notice of the practice to list
members and to give them the opportunity to opt out of the sharing. Id. at 151.
72
In 1993, the administration of President Bill Clinton established the Information
Infrastructure Task Force (“IITF”) to develop policies and programs for promoting the
development of a new “National Information Infrastructure.” Fred H. Cate, The
National Information Infrastructure: Policymaking and Policymakers, 6 STAN. L & POL’Y
REV. 43, 44, 47 (1994). The IITF contained a Privacy Working Group, which included in
its 1995 report a notice principle requiring that individuals be provided with information
sufficient to make informed decisions about their privacy. PRIVACY WORKING GRP.,
PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR
PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION II.B (1995), http://aspe.hhs.gov/
datacncl/niiprivp.htm [https://perma.cc/T329-39C8]. The White House reinforced this
principle in its 1997 framework. See WHITE HOUSE, THE FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.
html [https://perma.cc/R26K-PZS6] (“Data-gatherers should inform consumer what
information they are collecting and how they intend to use such data. . . .”). In 1996, the
FTC undertook a consumer privacy initiative to explore online privacy issues and
reported that participants in an online privacy workshop agreed that notice of information
practices is a principle essential to protecting privacy online. See FED. TRADE COMM’N
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Notice and Choice became the primary online privacy protection
mechanism. Indeed, in its 1998 report to Congress, the FTC asserted that notice is “the most fundamental principle” for protecting privacy online.73
Notice and Choice remains regulators’ preferred approach:
Both the White House and the FTC again advocated for Notice
and Choice when they issued major privacy reports in 2012.74 Why
do regulators so staunchly support the model? The next Section
addresses the benefits of and rationales for Notice and Choice.
2. Why Notice and Choice?
Since it was first articulated, the principles of Notice and
Choice have evolved to benefit individuals, businesses, and regulators alike. A primary benefit of Notice and Choice is that it is a selfregulatory scheme.75 Though guidelines exist for how companies
should draft their privacy policies and for what those policies
should include so that valid Notice and Choice is offered,76 compaBUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER
PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ch. 2 (1996), http://www.ftc.
gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacy-global-informationinfrastructure [https://perma.cc/U2X5-XRLW]. The initiative also concluded that there
was general agreement among participants that, in addition to providing notice,
organizations should offer choice and establish safeguards for information they hold. See
id.
73
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 7.
74
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 35–36, 61–64 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4DY-23R8]; WHITE
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY
11–18 (2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3U29-BHY7] (highlighting notice’s role, illustrating the challenges
organizations face in providing in light of emerging technology, and explaining the
significance of the consumer-company relationship in determining how notice is
provided).
75
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and
Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 489–90 (2015).
76
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 74, at 61–64; KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON
DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 4–5 (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4WMS-93KT].
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nies are largely free to construct their privacy policies as they see
fit. Notice and Choice is thus seen as a regulatory alternative that is
more flexible, less expensive to implement, and easier to enforce
than statutory or administrative regulation.77
Further, Notice and Choice is designed to put individuals in
charge of the collection and use of their personal information. By
placing decision-making power in individuals’ hands, Notice and
Choice supports individual autonomy.78 With proper notice, individuals can compare services based on their stated information
practices and can choose to transact with services based on how
those practices comport with the individual’s privacy preferences.79 Personal privacy preferences vary, and through Notice
and Choice, individuals who place a low value on privacy are able
to exchange it for goods or information that they value more highly,
such as free services.80 Individuals’ consent-based relationship has
the important effect of legitimizing the information practices disclosed through Notice and Choice.81
The individual autonomy that Notice and Choice supports influences the market for information. Individuals’ ability to make
decisions on how business’ information practices align with their
own privacy preferences makes privacy a type of “brand differentiator.”82 In this sense, disclosure through notice encourages privacy-based competition between online service providers.83 For
example, a privacy-conscious consumer might opt to transact with
77

See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 682 (2011) (noting that notice “looks cheap”
and “looks easy”).
78
See Calo, supra note 77.
79
See Paula J. Breuning & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass Darkly: From Privacy
Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 515, 529 (2016).
80
See Calo, supra note 77.
81
MacCarthy, supra note 31, at 440.
82
See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72 (“Disclosure by data-gatherers is designed to
simulate market resolution of privacy concerns by empowering individuals to obtain
relevant knowledge about why information is being collected, what the information will be
used for, what steps will be taken to protect that information, the consequences of
providing or withholding information, and any rights of redress that they may have. Such
disclosure will enable consumers to make better judgments about the levels of privacy
available and their willingness to participate.”).
83
See id.
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a business that promises to not share her information with third
parties, rather than one that does not make such a promise.84
Because of its effect on the market, Notice and Choice serves
as an appropriate basis for regulation. The FTC is the primary privacy enforcement authority in the United States, and is the agency
that polices Notice and Choice.85 Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act86 empowers the FTC to investigate and take enforcement action against companies that engage in “unfair” or
“deceptive” trade practices.87 Under this enforcement authority,
the FTC investigates businesses that engage in unfair or deceptive
information practices.88 The FTC has exercised this authority and
taken enforcement actions against bad actors frequently over the
past fifteen years.89 Indeed, the FTC’s privacy enforcement power
extends to a degree that some scholars have dubbed its privacy enforcement jurisprudence as a “common law of privacy.”90
Additionally, Notice and Choice encourages public dialogue
about information use and protection and thus promotes accountability. Privacy notices make an entity’s privacy practices public.
This provides a window through which individuals, businesses, and
regulators can observe the evolution of information practices with84

See id.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the
FTC’s role in privacy oversight and enforcement).
86
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
87
See § 45(a)(1).
88
See Haynes, supra note 22, at 600.
89
See, e.g., FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, et al., No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434
(D. Mass. July 21, 2000) (settling charges that ToySmart attempted to sell customers’
personal information to third parties despite promises to the contrary in the privacy
policy); Snapchat, Inc., No. 132 3078 (F.T.C. Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3LC-CDCF]
(settling charges alleging that Snapchat users’ photos did not automatically disappear
despite a promise to the contrary); Epic Marketplace, Inc., 155 F.T.C. 406 (2013)
(settling charges that Epic’s failure to disclose its practice of using customers’ browser
histories to deliver targeted advertising violated Section 5); GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94
(1999) (settling charges alleging that GeoCities’ privacy policy misrepresented how the
company used registered visitors’ marketing information); see also Reidenberg et al., supra
note 75, at 507–08 (indexing recent FTC privacy enforcement actions); Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 25, at 598–600 (summarizing the FTC’s privacy enforcement
history).
90
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 627.
85
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in the industry.91 The resulting discourse sometimes reveals privacy practices that become targets for regulatory enforcement.92 But
despite its advantages, Notice and Choice faces critiques. The next
Section addresses those, and offers a new one.
B. Privacy Policies’ Non-Contractual, Non-Binding Nature Is
Incongruent with the Notice and Choice Approach
Privacy advocates often criticize Notice and Choice as ineffective. Critics argue that Notice and Choice does not actually leave
people informed: People rarely see, read, or understand the privacy
policies they encounter,93 so individuals make false assumptions
about how websites and online services use and protect their information.94 The model is also considered impractical, because
there are simply too many privacy policies to keep track of, in light
of the potentially hundreds of websites an individual might visit on
any given day.95 And what makes things even more difficult for users is that privacy policies do not apply to the often-undisclosed
third parties with whom the policy owner might share user information.96 As a result, the downstream flow of user information
winds through the hands of a “potentially . . . unending chain of
91

See Breuning & Culnan, supra note 79, at 17.
See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UQZ3-8RUM] (action by privacy advocacy group Electronic Privacy
Information Center resulting in comprehensive consent decree containing privacyenhancing stipulations).
93
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
94
Two studies reveal this reality. In one, users of online services correctly answered
questions about the privacy of their online transactions only 30% of the time. Joseph
Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It
20–21 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214 [https://
perma.cc/K22M-5U97]. In another, 64% of survey respondents did not know that a
supermarket may sell other information about what they buy to other companies. Joseph
Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: America’s Shoppers Online and Offline 3 (2005),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_papers
[https://perma.cc/LB2H-XXEB]. The same study revealed that 75% of study
respondents incorrectly believed that the mere presence of a privacy policy meant that a
website would not disclose users’ information to other entities. Id.
95
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 77, at 687–89 (describing the “overload
effect” in online disclosure); Ohm, supra note 30, at 930; see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
96
See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 64, at 5.
92
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actors” in a way that is “not only difficult to grasp, but unknowable.”97 Notice and Choice, then, neither provides individuals with
adequate knowledge about the consequences of information disclosure nor with mechanisms for ensuring that their information is
disclosed only in the ways they desire.98
Further, websites and online services often unilaterally modify
their privacy policies without notifying users.99 This means that
even if a user were to follow the privacy statements of the websites
or services she uses, she may find that terms to which she initially
agreed no longer apply. This Note adds a new critique: Because
privacy policies are non-contractual in nature, Notice and Choice
breaks down when websites or online services execute information
practices that are different from those stated in their privacy policies, and in these instances individuals are left without the opportunity to seek redress on contractual grounds.
As this Note has shown, the development of case law addressing the issue rebuts the early notion that contract law would be the
most applicable tool for responding to privacy policy breaches.100
For one reason or another—policy form, plaintiffs’ inability to allege damages, or plaintiffs’ inability to prove reliance—courts are
unwilling to enforce privacy policies as binding agreements between a website and a user.101 This suggests that privacy policy
breaches may be “(effectively) categorically immune” from privately brought breach of contract claims.102 The consequence is
that though individuals may vet websites or online services and opt
to use those whose stated practices match their personal privacy
97
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preferences, when a service undertakes information practices that
are different from those stated, Notice and Choice fails to vindicate
individuals affected by the broken promise.
This undermines several of Notice and Choice’s objectives.
For one, it endangers the individual autonomy that Notice and
Choice fosters: If both a service’s notice and an individual’s choice
based on that notice can essentially evaporate with no consequence, the model lacks integrity. And, to the extent that companies can deviate from their stated information practices without
facing accountability, companies’ privacy practices cannot effectively serve as a basis for competition in the market.103
The disconnect between Notice and Choice and contract law is
important for other reasons as well. For one, individuals benefit
from services that enable us to work, shop, socialize, and play online, and services gain from the information users provide. In turn,
services leverage that gain to offer innovative products and features.104 But such a relationship is grounded in trust. If individuals
cannot trust that companies will use their information in the ways
prescribed in privacy policies, then individuals may cease using the
services and thus stunt innovation.105 Non-formalized privacy
agreements open the door for information misuse, and thus user
mistrust, while formalized privacy contracts could help to secure
the trust required for the described cycle of benefit to persist.
Additionally, there is the risk that websites or services will not
abide by the various guidelines that exist for offering valid Notice
and Choice.106 Though the FTC’s expanding enforcement power
103
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against companies that commit unfair or deceptive privacy practices likely mitigates this risk,107 early evidence suggested that the industry failed to adhere to FTC information principles, and that
other privacy self-regulation schemes (such as privacy certifications and monitoring) were ineffective.108 Privacy policies’ nonbinding effect means that companies can depart from regulators’
guidelines for valid Notice and Choice and escape liability from
privately brought contract claims.
One counterargument to this point is that the FTC polices privacy to a broad extent.109 Although the FTC plays a central role in
U.S. privacy enforcement, the agency has wielded its powers more
conservatively than it could, focusing mainly on the most egregious
offenders’ violations of the most prevalent industry norms.110
Thus, there might be privacy policy breaches of which the FTC is
unaware, or instances where the agency declines to initiate investigation or enforcement action. For example, many of the early privacy policy breach cases resulted from the vignette played out in
this Note’s introduction. That is, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, some airlines shared passenger information with Department
of Defense contractors in violation of their privacy policies.111 Given a similar context today, it is unlikely that government regulators
would investigate or penalize the airlines for such a breach. In these
107
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instances in which regulators do not act, privacy policies’ nonbinding effect means that individuals affected by breaches are left
empty-handed.
This problem with Notice and Choice affects not only individuals. To the extent that website owners include risk management
provisions (e.g., disclaimers, waivers, or arbitration clauses) in
their privacy policies, policy owners risk these terms being rendered as legally irrelevant (from a contracting perspective) when
these statements are held to be non-binding.112 When their online
terms are held unenforceable, websites and services are left governed by less favorable default legal rules and become, essentially,
“legally naked.”113
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR ALIGNING
NOTICE AND CHOICE AND CONTRACT LAW
A. Form-Based Solutions
Form-based solutions might help bridge the gap between Notice and Choice and contract law. One solution would be to require
that privacy policies are drafted as clickwrap agreements. If an individual manifests affirmative assent to a privacy policy’s terms at
the outset, it will be easier for her to establish that the terms form a
binding agreement between her and the service. Likewise, it will be
more difficult for her to, at a later date, argue that she lacked notice
of the service’s practices.
But businesses often view the clickwrap arrangement as inefficient and impractical, as they fear that website traffic will be negatively affected as a result of users’ impeded access.114 Accordingly,
regulatory or legislative action would likely be required to affect
this change. Similar regulatory attempts at term standardization

112
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have been successful,115 and state law to the same effect could be
persuasive.116
Another form-based solution would be to incorporate, by reference, privacy policies with other terms of use. Because terms of use
often include risk management provisions such as warranty disclaimers, liability limitations, and dispute resolution terms,117 services take steps to make these binding on users.118 While privacy
policies have traditionally been stand-alone documents, if they are
incorporated with other binding terms by reference, they would
have stronger binding effect.119
A shortcoming of either of these suggestions is that individuals
would still need to prove harm for their breach of contract claims to
stand. Because proving harm in the privacy context is difficult to
do,120 this could be a significant hurdle. These approaches could,
however, help users to establish reliance, which would aid claims
for promissory estoppel and would at least keep their contract
claims from being tossed aside based on policy, not contract interpretation.121
B. A Technical Solution
Technological tools in development could also bridge the gap
between Notice and Choice and contract law. For example, a web
browser plug-in to improve privacy policy usability is presently in
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development.122 The plug-in’s goal is to provide users with clear,
complete, and easily digestible information about the privacy policies of websites they visit.
The plug-in will take the form of a browser add-on that individuals can download, install, and use.123 Once activated, the plug-in
will employ natural language and machine learning techniques to
automatically “read” and interpret the privacy policy of each website a user visits. The plug-in will then present the user with a justin-time notice about the website’s privacy practices, as articulated
in the privacy policy.124 The plug-in will present the user with a
summary of information about the website’s information practices
122
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regarding sharing, collection, use, and other elements. Essentially,
the plug-in will provide a shorthand version of the privacy policy so
that users need not read the entire policy itself. The plug-in will
also highlight options that the policy offers to users (e.g., the opportunity to opt out of certain data sharing or collection) and direct
them on how to exercise those options. Through these features, the
plug-in will allow users to make informed choices about whether to
use the website or take action to protect their personal information
while using it.
Installation and use of the plug-in could provide evidence of notice of privacy policy terms. This could help privacy policy breach
plaintiffs establish that they relied on the policy terms, thus aiding
claims based on a theory of promissory estoppel. The notice provided by a plug-in could also make it possible for courts to hold that
the policy terms are binding even if the original policy takes browsewrap form, because, in interpreting browsewraps, courts “focus
on whether the plaintiff had reasonable notice” of the browsewrap
terms.125 Courts have held that whether such agreements are binding depends on the website user’s “actual or constructive knowledge” of the terms prior to using the website or service.126 Thus,
to be bound, the parties need not have an actual “meeting of the
minds”127—rather, a reasonable communication of the agreement
terms suffices to render the terms a binding agreement between the
website and users.128 The “reasonable communication” requirement is fulfilled through a combination of reasonable notice of and
the opportunity to review terms, which serves as a “proxy for the
offeree’s clear manifestation of assent.”129 In the browsewrap context, “reasonable communication” can be manifested through a
125
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conspicuous display of the terms.130 A browser plug-in that automatically conveys to users the privacy terms of every website they
visit could provide sufficient reasonable communication to render
those terms binding. This would have the effect of making a website or service’s privacy policy statements binding between the service and the user, and would make any privacy policy violation a
breach of the privacy contract.
Nevertheless, legal and practical issues surround the use of this
sort of technical tool. For example, courts may not consider the
plug-in’s notice a valid “reasonable communication” of a website’s privacy terms because the plug-in is an independent technology not offered by any website itself. A court might be reluctant to
give a policy binding effect when its drafter lacked the intent to
make it binding.131
Even if courts were to accept the plug-in as a valid “reasonable
communication,” an issue remains regarding uniform use and application. For example, if an individual uses the plug-in to receive
notice of and establish reliance on the policy, the policy should be
binding as between the individual and the website or service. But
the same policy would not be binding as to the website or service
and an individual who did not download and use the plug-in.
Another issue relates to plug-in design. Whether due to purposefully open-ended drafting or the use of intentionally vague
terms, privacy policies are often ambiguous.132 Accordingly, there
is the risk that the natural language processing and machine learning tools upon which the plug-in is built may inaccurately interpret
privacy policy statements, and thus provide users with a less-thanaccurate notice of what the policy means to convey. It would be
difficult, and possibly unfair, for a court to enforce terms for which
inaccurate notice was given.
130
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And finally, the issue of harm remains. Even if all the issues
discussed above resolve in such a way that a user can cite to her use
of the plug-in to establish notice and reliance, she must still allege
harm resulting from any breach. But like the form-based solution
described above, technological tools might at least help users establish reliance and thus ground their claims in contract theory.
CONCLUSION
Privacy policies are the primary mechanism for effectuating the
Notice and Choice model for protecting privacy online. Though
they may seem to be contractual, jurisprudence dictates that privacy policies typically lack binding effect between individuals and
websites or online services. This means that in some circumstances
where websites or online services engage in information practices
that differ from those stated in their privacy policies, individual users lack the opportunity to seek redress on contractual grounds.
This result is at odds with the objectives of and rationales for Notice and Choice. Though form- and technology-based solutions
might bridge the gap between Notice and Choice and contract law,
these solutions may not be immediately practicable and questions
remain as to whether and how they would work, even if they were
available.
Overall, this Note shines a light on Notice and Choice and
presents a new critique of the model. This critique raises questions
about the model’s efficiency, and more generally, it raises normative issues about the best means of protecting individual privacy in
the online context.

